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What explains the uneven take-up of ISO 14001 
at the global level? A panel data analysis 
 
Abstract.  
Since its release in the mid-1990s, close to 37,000 facilities have been certified to ISO 
14001, the international, voluntary standard for environmental management systems. 
Yet, despite claims that the standard can be readily adapted to very different 
corporate and geographic settings, its take-up has been highly geographically 
variable. This paper contributes to a growing body of work concerned with 
explaining the uneven diffusion of ISO 14001 at the global level. Drawing from the 
existing theoretical and empirical literature we develop a series of hypotheses about 
how various economic, market and regulatory factors influence the national count of 
ISO 14001 certifications. These hypotheses are then tested using econometric 
estimation techniques using data for a panel of 142 developed and developing 
countries. We find that per capita ISO 14001 counts are positively correlated with 
income per capita, stock of foreign direct investment, exports of goods and services to 
Europe and Japan, and pressure from civil society. Conversely, productivity and 
levels of state intervention are negatively correlated. The paper finishes by offering a 
number of recommendations to policy-makers concerned with accelerating the 
diffusion of voluntary environmental standards. 
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Introduction 
One of the most significant trends in corporate environmental governance since the 
early-1980s has been the rapid growth of self-regulatory initiatives (Rondinelli & 
Berry, 2000; Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002; Paton, 2002). These comprise a variety 
of approaches and instruments whereby firms set and enforce rules and standards of 
permissible behaviour on a voluntary basis, rather than in response to formal 
regulatory requirements (Segerson & Li, 1999; Haufler, 2001). Yet, arguably the 
most visible example of self-regulation has been ISO 14001, an international, 
voluntary standard for environmental management promoted by the Geneva-based 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
In common with many other self-regulatory codes adopted by corporations over 
the past two decades the origins of ISO 14001 are deeply rooted in the process of 
globalisation. It was primarily conceived to facilitate trade and investment by 
replacing numerous and often conflicting national standards for environmental 
management with a single international one (Davy, 1997; Quazi et al, 2001; Melnyk 
et al, 2003). Moreover, in defining a framework for environmental improvement 
flexible enough to be adapted to very different national and corporate conditions, the 
architects of ISO 14001 hoped that the standard would appeal to firms in both 
developed and developing countries (Rondinelli & Vastag, 2000; Wilson, 2002).1 
Yet, despite its alleged global credentials, it is clear that implementation of ISO 
14001 has been highly geographically uneven. In absolute numbers, uptake has been 
                                                 
1
 The term “firm” is used broadly here to denote all private- and public-sector entities, ranging from 
manufacturing units to administrative buildings, capable of acquiring ISO 14001 certification. 
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greatest in Japan, followed by a number of leading European countries, the US and 
Australia. A number of late industrialising economies in East and Southeast Asia 
have also been rapidly implementing the standard in recent years. Elsewhere, 
however, uptake has been comparatively low (Matouq, 2000; Steger, 2000). In per 
capita terms, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Singapore, Australia, Japan 
and some other European countries top the list. 
What explains the wide variation in the take-up of ISO 14001? Previous insights 
into this question have mostly come from comparative analyses of certification 
counts in Europe and the US (Prakash, 1999; Delmas, 2002; Kollman & Prakash, 
2002). These studies have been instrumental in highlighting the role played by 
different features of the national institutional environment in promoting and/or 
inhibiting the take-up of ISO 14001. Based on qualitative evidence from a handful of 
developed economies, however, question marks remain over the generalisability of 
their findings. This points to the need for multiple country, quantitative research. Yet, 
the only study of this kind is itself problematic (Corbett & Kirsch, 2001), relying on a 
handful of dubious proxy variables and omitting a large number of developing 
countries from the sample. 
This paper responds to the gap in the existing literature by undertaking a more 
systematic and broad-based analysis of international variations in the uptake of ISO 
14001. Drawing from recent theoretical and empirical literature on industry self-
regulation and environmental management systems (EMS) we develop a series of 
hypotheses about the relationship between ISO 14001 certification counts and various 
characteristics of the national institutional environment. These hypotheses are then 
tested quantitatively for a panel of 142 countries using a set of measurable proxies. 
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Briefly, our results suggest that take-up of ISO 14001 has been influenced by both 
supply-side and demand-side factors. The per capita certification count is positively 
correlated with income per capita, the export of goods and services to Europe and 
Japan, the presence of foreign direct investment and pressure from civil society. 
Conversely, productivity and state intervention are negatively correlated with per 
capita certification counts.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we provide a brief 
introduction to ISO 14001 and review previous studies that have sought to explain 
cross-country variations in take-up of the standard. Hypotheses are developed in the 
next section. We then describe the data and methods used in the study, followed by 
results and a broader discussion of the implications of our research. 
 
The nature and origins of ISO 14001 
According to Steger (2000, p.24), an environmental management system (EMS) can 
be defined as, ‘…a transparent, systematic process known corporate-wide, with the 
purpose of prescribing and implementing environmental goals, policies, and 
responsibilities, as well as regular auditing of its elements.’ The origins of systems 
for managing firms’ environmental impacts can be traced back to the 1970s (Krut & 
Gleckman, 1998). Yet it was not until the following decade that widespread interest 
in EMS emerged. This was closely bound-up with a broader shift towards self-
regulation whereby firms, subject to ever greater levels of public scrutiny, began to 
adopt voluntary codes of conduct in order to demonstrate their environmental 
commitment (Clapp, 2001; Hoffman, 2001; Stewart, 2001; King et al., 2002). The 
first EMS were unilateral, firm-level initiatives. Since the early-1990s, however, a 
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number of “standardised” environmental management systems have been developed 
by various national (e.g., the British Standards Institute’s 7750) and regional bodies 
(e.g., the European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme) (Starkey, 1996). 
ISO 14001 continues this trend toward standardisation at the international 
level. It was developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), a 
Swiss-based non-governmental organisation set-up in 1946. Traditionally, the ISO 
restricted its activities to writing technical standards for products in order to expedite 
trade and technology transfer (Clapp, 2001). However, beginning in the late-1980s, it 
began writing standards for management processes and procedures. Following the 
success of its first procedural standard, the ISO 9000 series for quality management, 
the ISO initiated steps to introduce a parallel set of standards for environmental 
management. The result was the ISO 14000 series which aims to provide a 
comprehensive framework for systematically improving environmental performance 
that can be accepted and implemented by organisations worldwide (Quazi et al, 
2001). 
 ISO 14000 consists of two types of standard. The first, and the centrepiece of 
the series, is the ISO 14001 procedural standard. A number of facilities certified 
themselves to draft versions of ISO 14001 prior to its official release in September 
1996 (ISO, 2002). ISO 14001 sets out the minimum requirements of an effective 
environmental management system. These comprise main five elements: (1) an 
environmental policy; (2) an assessment of the organisation’s environmental effects 
and compliance with legal and other requirements; (3) a management system defining 
the responsibilities, procedures and controls required to achieve the organisation’s 
environmental policy; (4) periodic audits and reviews of the environmental 
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management system to ensure continuous improvement; and (5) a public statement 
declaring that ISO 14001 is being implemented (Krut & Gleckman, 1998, pp.10-12). 
 Accompanying ISO 14001 is a set of guidance standards intended to provide 
assistance to managers in various aspects of environmental management. Several of 
these provide guidelines for evaluating an organisation’s environmental performance 
and management system, e.g.,  ISO 14010/11/12 (Environmental Auditing). Others, 
meanwhile, are process and product evaluation standards which, as their name 
suggests, focus on the analysis and evaluation of product and process characteristics, 
e.g., ISO 14020 (Environmental Labelling) (Melnyk et al, 2003). 
 ISO 14001 is the only certifiable standard in the 14000 series. Firms that 
comply with its requirements have two choices: declare themselves in compliance; or 
use a registered auditor to verify that the organisation’s operations conform to the 
documented environmental management system (Rondinelli & Vastag, 2000; 
Mendel, 2002). In practice, self-certification carries only limited credibility, with the 
result that many firms prefer third party accreditation. 
ISO 14001 has come in for considerable criticism since its release in 1996. Much 
of this has centred on the fact that the standard does not require certified facilities to 
reduce their environmental impacts or set specific performance targets. Instead, it 
merely calls on firms to commit themselves to legal compliance, a condition that 
critics believe is unlikely to evoke significant investments in environmental 
improvement (Roht-Arriaza, 1997; Krut & Gleckman, 1998; Clapp, 2001; Bansal & 
Bogner, 2002). Supporters, however, claim that such criticism is misplaced. They 
argue that it is precisely the standard’s flexibility that makes it a useful tool to address 
environmental issues in very different corporate and geographic settings.  
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What is clear is that, much like ISO 9000 before it, ISO 14001 has proved 
popular with firms. In the six-year period 1995-2001 the number of certified facilities 
grew from 257 to 36,765. Yet, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, uptake of the standard has 
been geographically uneven. So far, certification activity has been greatest in Europe 
and, to a lesser extent, the Far East. Elsewhere, however, enthusiasm for ISO 14001 
has been comparatively low. In fact, only ten countries account for nearly 70 per cent 
of world certifications, seven of which are member states of the European Union. 
 
< Insert tables 1 and 2 about here > 
 
Review and critique of the existing literature 
What accounts for the uneven diffusion of ISO 14001 worldwide? This question has 
recently been addressed by two bodies of literature. Drawing heavily from 
institutional theory the first group of studies have taken a largely qualitative approach 
(Prakash, 1999; Delmas, 2002; Kollman & Prakash, 2002; Milstein et al, 2002). Their 
starting point is the belief that firms will only implement ISO 14001 where the 
apparent benefits more than offset the costs and, moreover, that these costs and 
revenues are in turn shaped by the broader institutional environment in which firms 
operate. 
Following this approach, the very different certification counts in Europe and the 
US are explained in terms of distinctive demand and supply-side characteristics of 
their national institutional environments. Thus, Kollman & Prakash (2002) and 
Delmas (2002) point to the pivotal role played by the British Standards Institute (BSI) 
in promoting ISO 14001 in the UK, and how the absence of an equivalent body has 
  8 
hindered similar take-up of the standard in the US. They also draw a contrast between 
Germany, where certified firms have often received “relief” from regulatory agencies, 
and the US, whose more adversarial and legalistic tradition has prohibited similar 
concessions from being granted to ISO 14001 compliant facilities. The result, these 
scholars argue, is that the economic incentives for implementing the standard have 
been far lower. Going further, Delmas describes how, unlike the US, many European 
countries had prior experience of formal EMS (e.g., EMAS). This lowered the 
subsequent costs of implementing and certifying ISO 14001 and contributed to its 
greater popularity.  
The second approach taken in the literature is quantitative and has sought to 
identify the determinants of ISO 14001 adoption using data from a far larger sample 
of countries. It is represented by a single study, Corbett & Kirsch (2001), who use a 
regression model to estimate the influence of four variables for a sample of 63 
developed and developing countries in 1998. The authors find statistically significant 
and positive relationships between ISO 14001 counts and export propensity, 
“environmentality” and, most strongly of all, ISO 9000 counts. Curiously, however, 
their estimations suggest that the level of development, proxied by income per capita, 
does not have a statistically significant effect. 
The above works have done much to increase our understanding of various 
demand- and supply-side variables implicated in the uneven diffusion of the ISO 
14001 environmental management standard across the globe. Neither, however, is 
without substantial drawbacks. Based exclusively on qualitative analysis and 
evidence from a handful of developed economies recent institutionalist accounts can 
be criticised for their lack of generalisability.  
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Corbett & Kirsch’s (2001) study overcomes some of these shortcomings in that it 
uses quantitative techniques in a larger sample of developed and developing 
countries. Yet, it too, is not without its weaknesses. Partly as a result of data 
limitations the study only investigates a few variables. Moreover, several of these rely 
on proxies which, at best, are weakly rooted in the actual concepts the authors purport 
to measure. For example, Corbett & Kirsch (2001) use a count of international 
environmental treaties ratified by each country as a proxy for “environmental 
attitude” or “environmentality”. It is far from clear, however, that ratification of 
international environmental treaties (“environmentality”) is a satisfactory measure of 
“…the extent to which firms in a given country are predisposed to care about 
environmental issues, whether due to government regulations or incentives, pressure 
from consumers, employees, NGOs…or for other reasons” (p. 334). Recent 
conceptual approaches argue that it is precisely the failure of public law and 
regulation to reflect wider societal demands for environmental protection that 
underpin the emergence and diffusion of self-regulatory codes. Similarly, relying on a 
measure of aggregate exports to GDP ratio to capture supply chain pressures for 
certification in foreign markets has only limited appeal, since reports strongly 
indicate that these requirements are only currently important in Europe and Japan 
(Roht-Arriaza, 1997; Tanner, 1998).  
More generally, although Corbett & Kirsch include the majority of countries 
with ISO 14001 certifications in their sample (N=63), they omit all the ones that do 
not. Selecting a sample on such a criterion leads to well-known selection bias in the 
estimations. Indeed, given that many of the excluded countries are developing ones, 
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we suspect that it could go some way in explaining the surprising result that per 
capita income has no statistically significant effect on certification counts.  
This paper seeks to overcome several of the weaknesses inherent in previous 
work. With a view to generating more generalisable findings than existing qualitative 
contributions we use econometric estimation techniques. Yet, going beyond Corbett 
& Kirsch, our study features a much larger sample (N=142) that is only constrained 
by the availability of data for our explanatory variables. Additionally, we test for the 
influence of a larger number of demand- and supply-side variables, using measures 
more firmly rooted in the actual decision of firms to implement and certify ISO 
14001. Finally, in contrast to Corbett & Kirsch, our econometric model uses a lagged 
dependent variable. This allows us to control for the dynamics of ISO 14001 uptake 
and, with it, the well-documented propensity of firms in countries with previous 
experience of ISO 14001 to adopt the standard2 (Delmas, 2002; Kollman & Prakash, 
2002). Without a panel data set, Corbett & Kirsch see no alternative to using ISO 
9000 take-up as a proxy for modelling this diffusion process, a shortcoming we 
correct with our research design.3 As such, we are better able to investigate other 
variables thought to influence the take-up of ISO 14001. Inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable also mitigates potential omitted variable bias since it is correlated 
                                                 
2
 These so-called  “path dependencies” in certification are commonly explained by the accumulation of 
internal (e.g., know-how in documentation, procedural standardisation, etc.) and external (e.g., 
consultancy services, registered auditors, etc.) capabilities which lower the subsequent costs, as well as 
the perceived risks, of adopting ISO 14001 (Corbett & Kirsch, 2000; Kollman & Prakash, 2002). 
3
 It is telling that if we include the count of ISO 9000 certified companies as a further explanatory 
variable in our estimation, its coefficient is clearly statistically insignificant. 
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with any such variable (Finkel 1995). Because no model is ever complete, omitted 
variables always represent a problem, potentially biasing the estimations. The 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable mitigates this problem as the omitted 
variables are indirectly controlled for. 
In the next section we develop a series of hypotheses about how various 
economic, market and regulatory factors influence the national count of ISO 14001 
certifications. For guidance, we draw not only from the findings of studies reviewed 
above, but also a growing body of literature examining the take-up of environmental 
management systems at the firm-level. This work has identified several reasons for 
implementing an EMS and suggests that adoption decisions are often based on a 
number of different motives (e.g., Matouq, 2000; Khanna & Anton, 2002; Morrow & 
Rondinelli, 2002). At the outset, it is worth pointing out that our choice of variables is 
necessarily limited by the availability of data. Supply-side factors, such as the 
availability of assistance from non-governmental bodies, are especially problematic 
in this respect. Still, we believe that our study offers an innovative test of several of 
the most important variables implicated in the variable take-up of ISO 14001. 
 
Development of hypotheses 
No doubt, one of the most important predications supplied by the existing literature is 
that firms will only implement and certify themselves to ISO 14001 where they face 
strong demand-side incentives to do so. These are said to be provided by two 
principal actors, markets and civil society. Beginning with the former, a great deal 
has been written about pressure from business customers in export markets, and 
particularly developed economy ones. If anecdotal reports are believed, a growing 
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number of firms in these countries are requiring their local and overseas suppliers to 
be certified to ISO 14001. Moreover, expecting ISO 14001 to become a de facto 
standard in the coming decade, many suppliers are obtaining certification in order to 
“future-proof” themselves (Chin & Pun, 1999; Steger, 2000; Cosbey, 2002; Rock, 
2002). According to more sophisticated accounts, however, supply chain 
requirements for ISO 14001 are only a significant factor for exporters of goods and 
services to Europe and Japan4 (Roht-Arriaza, 1997; Tanner, 1998; Kollman & 
Prakash, 2002). Only a handful of larger firms in the US, by contrast, are mandating 
certification meaning that the incentive to adopt ISO 14001 is likely to be 
comparatively low (Delmas, 2002). Indeed, as Table 2 above has shown, in relative 
terms there are very few ISO 14001 certifications in the US. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 1. Countries that export a higher share of goods and services relative to 
their output to European Union states or Japan will have a higher number of ISO 
14001 certifications, whereas exports to the US do not matter. 
 
Another source of market demand discussed in the literature comes from 
transnational corporations (TNCs). Many of these firms, and particularly the larger, 
more visible ones, are vulnerable to negative publicity regarding their environmental 
performance (Willetts, 1998; Hastings, 1999). Consequently, a growing number of 
                                                 
4
 Tanner (1998) describes how many firms in developing Asia found themselves unprepared to meet 
customer requirements for ISO 9000 in Europe. Consequently, they are rapidly certifying themselves 
to ISO 14001, anticipating that the standard will similarly become a condition for doing business in the 
near future. 
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them are requiring their local affiliates and subsidiaries to adopt voluntary 
environmental codes (UNCTAD, 1999; Steger, 2000; Haufler, 2001). In practice, this 
often means ISO 14001 which provides a single, flexible standard that can be applied 
and adapted across business units in different countries (Epstein & Roy, 1998; 
Rondinelli & Vastag, 2000; Perry & Singh, 2002). Going further, in order to guard 
against environmental and reputational liabilities in supply chains, many leading 
TNCs are requesting their suppliers to implement and certify ISO 14001 compliant 
environmental management systems (Chang-Xing, 1999). This probably explains 
Khanna & Anton’s (2002) finding that US firms with a stronger multinational 
presence are more likely to adopt an EMS. Taken together, then, these accounts 
suggest that the local presence of transnationals is likely to be supportive of ISO 
14001 certification. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Countries with higher levels of TNC involvement will have a higher 
number of ISO 14001 certifications. 
 
A third market-based motive for implementing an EMS that has received widespread 
coverage in the recent literature is to secure competitive advantage through 
improvements in operating performance. Of these, productivity gains appear to be the 
most important, with proponents claiming that firms which implement ISO 14001 can 
save significant costs by way of enhanced operational efficiency (Rondinelli & Berry, 
2000). Systematic evidence for these gains has yet to be established. However, 
according to several commentators, they are likely to be greatest amongst firms with 
low levels of productivity. Such firms, it is argued, have still to exploit many low 
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cost, high return investments in operational efficiency (so-called “low hanging fruit”) 
and are therefore well placed to gain substantially from implementing systems that 
assist in the identification and realisation of these opportunities (Davy, 1997; Tanner, 
1998). Companies with already high levels of efficiency, by contrast, stand relatively 
little to gain from implementing an ISO 14001 compliant management system, 
reducing their incentive to adopt the standard. Indeed, these claims are supported by 
recent survey evidence, revealing that ISO 14001 has brought greater gains to 
certified firms in developing countries (where one might assume productivity levels 
are relatively low) than their counterparts in developed ones (where productivity are 
likely to be higher) (Raines, 2002): 
 
Hypothesis 3. Countries with lower levels of productivity will have a higher number 
of ISO 14001 certifications. 
 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other civil society groups are another 
set of stakeholders widely implicated in generating demand for ISO 14001. 
According to an influential body of work such groups are assuming growing 
importance in “regulating” the activities of corporations. Not only are they acting as 
surrogate enforcement officials, putting pressure on corporations to adhere to 
regulatory norms, but NGOs are also taking a lead role in defining norms of 
appropriate and legitimate environmental behaviour. This, the literature suggests, 
owes much to the regulatory vacuum created by the failure of public law and 
enforcement to keep pace with rising environmental demand which has meant that 
firms must increasingly secure a “licence to operate” directly from civil society by 
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demonstrating their commitment to sound levels of environmental performance 
(Neale, 1997; Rodgers, 2000; Perry & Singh, 2002). 
One way of accomplishing this is through the adoption of self-regulatory codes 
such as ISO 14001. These signal conformity with a recognisable standard and can 
help firms to communicate their environmental achievements to external stakeholders 
(Davy, 1997; Prakash, 1999; Bansal & Bogner, 2002). As such, they can help ward-
off criticism from NGOs, delay calls from these groups for the introduction of more 
stringent government regulation, and even provide firms with rewards from 
customers and financial institutions (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002). No doubt this 
explains why firms, both in developing and especially developed economies, 
recurrently cite “public image” and “social responsibility” as one of the primary 
motives for implementing and certifying ISO 14001 (Matouq, 2000; Delmas, 2002; 
Mbohwa & Fukada, 2002; Morrow & Rondinelli, 2002; Perry & Singh, 2002; Raines, 
2002).  
Clearly, however, the incentive to adopt ISO 14001 will depend on the degree of 
pressure from civil society groups (Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002; Hanks, 2002). 
Where there are few NGOs to monitor and enforce standards of corporate behaviour, 
the benefits of adopting the standard on public relations grounds alone are likely to be 
relatively low. By contrast, where environmental demand is high, manifest in a dense 
network of NGOs, the incentive will be far greater. Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the number of environmental NGOs relative to population 
size present in a country the higher the number of ISO 14001 certifications. 
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Given the suggestion that firms must also secure legitimacy for their activities from 
society at large certification pressures are also likely to depend on the general level of 
public demand for environmental quality. Assuming, as many analysts do, that the 
environment is a normal good (McConnell, 1997), this implies that ISO certification 
counts will be greatest in rich countries and least in poor ones.    
Yet, as well as influencing demand, income is also portrayed in the literature as 
determining the ability of firms to supply environmental self-regulation. According to 
analysts, this stems from the relatively high start-up and subsequent maintenance 
costs of ISO 14001 (Chin & Pun, 1999), particularly where firms: (a) have little or no 
previous experience of environmental or quality management systems; (b) lack the 
necessary financial, technological and managerial resources and capabilities to 
implement and certify to ISO 14001; and (c) do not have the support of a network of 
governmental and/or non-governmental organisations committed to promoting the 
standard (Steger, 2000; Bansal & Bogner, 2002). In practice, experience suggests that 
both of these conditions are most likely to be found in developing countries, 
especially in the small-and-medium-scale sector (Chang-Xing, 1999; Raines, 2002). 
Indeed, the high costs of implementation and certification are recurrently cited as one 
of the key reasons for low levels of ISO 14001 certification in low-income countries 
(Davy, 1997; Mbohwa & Fukada, 2002). Taken together, therefore, these demand- 
and supply-side considerations suggest: 
 
Hypothesis 5. The higher the per capita income the higher the number of ISO 14001 
certifications. 
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More conceptually, it has been argued that the recent growth of industry self-
regulation has gone hand-in-hand with the shift towards a smaller, more market-
driven state (Haufler, 2001). Thus, according to critics, globalisation has heightened 
concern over the impact of environmental regulations on industrial competitiveness 
(Stewart, 2001; Evans et al., 2002; Welford, 2002). As a result, a growing number of 
governments in both developed and developing countries are turning towards 
voluntary initiatives, promoted as a more flexible and cost-effective alternative to 
conventional directive- or market-based forms of regulation (Hillary & Thorsen, 
1999; Haufler, 2001; Newell, 2001; Gunningham & Sinclair, 2002; Wilson, 2002). 
What this suggests is that, far from being a complement to tougher public law 
and enforcement, self-regulatory codes such as ISO 14001 are more likely to be 
acting as a substitute. Moreover, given the implication that the shift towards corporate 
voluntarism is part of a broader neo-liberal project to transfer the political and 
administrative costs of regulation from the public to the private domain (Finger & 
Tamiotti, 1999), one might expect the uptake of ISO 14001 to be most advanced in 
governmental regimes with limited state intervention. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 6. Countries with lower levels of state intervention are likely to have a 
higher number ISO 14001 certifications.  
 
Research design 
ISO (2002) publishes the number of facilities certified to ISO 14001 at the country 
level. To make this variable comparable, we normalise by population size so that our 
dependent variable is the number of ISO 14001 certifications per one million 
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inhabitants (ISO14001 p.c.). The data cover the period from 1996, the official release 
date of ISO 14001, to 2001. Our ten explanatory variables are as follows. The value 
of exports relative to gross domestic product (GDP) is measured by three separate 
variables, referring to goods and services exported to the 15 countries of the 
European Union (EU15), the US, and Japan (EXPEU15GDP, EXPUSGDP, 
EXPJAPANGDP). Data are taken from OECD (2003). For the EU countries the 
EXPEU15GDP variable refers to exports to the other 14 EU members, for the US and 
Japan the EXPUSGDP and the EXPJAPANGDP variables are coded zero, 
respectively. We measure the level of transnational involvement by the stock of FDI 
relative to GDP since this better captures the overall impact of foreign TNCs in the 
host economy than volatile short-term inflows (FDISTOCKGDP). These data are 
sourced from UNCTAD (2003). For productivity we have divided GDP in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) by the size of the labour force, yielding a measure of product per 
worker (GDPPERWORKER). Data are taken from World Bank (2003). As our 
measure of demand from civil society we use the per capita number of environmental 
non-governmental organisations (ENVIROGROUPS p.c.) per country as reported by 
Europa Publications (2001). This variable refers to the late-1990s and is time-
invariant due to lack of data. This is not problematic as the level of demand from civil 
society is unlikely to have changed much over such a short period as 1996 to 2001. 
Per capita income (GDP p.c.) is measured by per capita GDP in PPP, taken from 
World Bank (2003). It is important to use income data in PPP, and not the 
conventional income data at foreign exchange rates, since the latter are known to 
substantially underestimate effective purchasing power in poor countries. As stated 
above, per capita income potentially captures both demand- and supply-side factors 
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implicated in the take-up of ISO 14001.  However, since we control for 
environmental demand through the inclusion of environmental NGOs, our income 
variable might be expected to predominantly measure supply-side aspects. 
With respect to government intervention, we would ideally have liked to use a 
variable which specifically measures the stringency of public environmental law and 
enforcement. Yet no such variable is available for our full sample of countries. In its 
absence, we take a variable published by the conservative Heritage Foundation 
(2003), which forms part of their Index of Economic Freedom, as a proxy for the 
extent of general government intervention in the economy (GOVINTERVENTION). 
The Foundation grades countries on a one to five scale according to: (a) the level of 
government consumption as a percentage of the economy; (b) the extent of 
government ownership of businesses and industries; (c) the share of government 
revenues from state-owned enterprises; (d) government ownership of property; and 
(e) economic output produced by the government. 
As a further control variable we use total GDP in PPP as a proxy for economic 
size (GDP), taken from World Bank (2003). Without recourse to data representing 
the total number of firms in a country, we realistically assume that bigger economies 
are likely to have more firms. A higher number of firms makes it more likely that 
some of them are front-runners that experiment with ISO 14001 certification and 
stimulate a self-reinforcing process of take-up through the domestic economy via 
coercive and demonstrative influences. We therefore expect a positive effect of 
economic size on the per capita ISO 14001 count. A final control variable is the 
manufacturing share of GDP (%MANUFACT), taken from World Bank (2003) and 
supplemented by CIA (2002). All nominal variables have been converted to real 1996 
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prices using the United States GDP deflator, taken from World Bank (2003). Table 3 
provides summary descriptive variable information. Note that the panel is not fully 
balanced since, in the case of a small number of countries, one or more observations 
are missing due to insufficient data on one of the explanatory variables. Table 4 lists 
the countries included in the sample. 
 
< Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here > 
 
We estimate the following model: 
 
yit = α + β1yit-1 + β2xit + γtTt + vit. 
 
The subscript i represents each country in year t, y is the number of ISO 14001 
certifications and x is the vector of explanatory variables. The year-specific dummy 
variables T capture general developments such as the worldwide spread of awareness 
about the standard and correct for unobserved time effects. The vit is a stochastic error 
term. We estimate equation (1) with Beck & Katz’s (1995) popular and commonly 
applied time-series cross-sectional estimator with panel-corrected standard errors. 
The error term is presumed to be heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated 
across panels. Beck & Katz provide evidence from Monte Carlo analysis showing 
that their estimator is more conservative and less likely to underestimate standard 
errors than feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), the alternative estimator. Their 
estimator is thus less likely to wrongly attribute statistical significance to a 
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coefficient, which is in fact insignificant. Such conservatism suits our research 
purpose well. 
As argued above, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable mitigates any 
omitted variable bias. It does so more comprehensively than estimation with country 
fixed-effects because the lagged dependent variable even mitigates the bias of time-
varying omitted variables. This is why we use Beck & Katz’s (1995) time-series 
cross-sectional estimator with panel-corrected standard errors and a lagged dependent 
variable rather than a fixed effects model. Another reason for this choice is that one 
of our variables is time-invariant and some others do not change much over time. A 
fixed-effects estimator cannot estimate the former and would estimate the latter only 
very inefficiently. 
We take the natural log of the dependent variable after adding one to the absolute 
number of ISO 14001 counts to make such logging possible for values of zero in 
order to mitigate the heteroscedasticity of the data. As concerns the explanatory 
variables, we log all variables, which are strictly positive. In other words, our model 
is a log-linear one for most explanatory variables, which allows an easy to understand 
elasticity interpretation of the estimated coefficients. For a logged independent 
variable, an estimated coefficient of, say, 0.9 means that a one per cent increase in 
this variable is associated with a 0.9 per cent increase in ISO14001 certification. This 
model also exhibited a much better fit to the data.  
 
Results 
Column I of Table 5 reports estimation results for the full sample and column II for a 
sample that excludes all developed countries, namely Canada and the US, the 15 
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European Union countries, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand and 
Australia. 
Consistent with a priori expectations, countries with greater exports of goods and 
services to the European Union and Japan have a higher uptake of ISO 14001 in per 
capita terms. The coefficient of the exports to the US variable is negative and 
statistically significant. A higher level of transnational involvement as measured by 
FDISTOCKGDP leads to a higher number of ISO 14001 certifications. So does a 
higher level of demand from civil society as measured by ENVIROGROUPS p.c. 
Richer countries have more ISO 14001 certified facilities per capita. Countries in 
which the government intervenes more in the economy have a lower certification 
count, as do countries with higher productivity. 
As concerns the control variables, the lagged dependent variable is highly 
significant and positive, thereby conforming with expectations. As anticipated, we 
find that bigger economies have more certifications per capita, but a higher 
manufacturing share of GDP is not related to take-up of ISO 14001. 
Results are very similar in terms of coefficient sign and statistical significance if 
the sample is restricted to the non-developed countries (column II). The only 
difference is that EXPEU15GDP turns insignificant in this smaller sample. This 
suggests that our main results are not merely driven by the inclusion of developed 
countries in the sample. 
 
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
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How strong is the effect of each variable? Since variables are held in different 
units and have different distributions the estimated coefficients cannot be compared 
directly with each other. However, the method of so-called (semi-)standardized 
coefficients allows us to compare the effect of variables held in different units with 
each other. Table 6 presents the percentage increase in per capita ISO 14001 take-up 
following a substantial increase in one of the explanatory variables, where we take a 
one standard deviation increase in a variable to represent a ‘substantial’ increase 
(estimates refer to the full sample model). With the presence of the lagged dependent 
variable in the model, these are to be interpreted as short-term or instantaneous 
increases, but the ranking of variables in terms of magnitude of effect does not 
change if we were to compute long-term changes instead. It is clear that per capita 
income, exports to the EU, economic size and productivity are the substantively most 
important factors, followed by the export to Japan and the US variables. The 
penetration of the economy with foreign capital is about equally important as 
environmental NGO presence and the extent of government intervention in the 
economy. The share of manufacturing is not only statistically insignificant, but also 
substantively unimportant. 
 
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
This study seeks to advance understanding of the factors that determine take-up of 
ISO 14001, the international, voluntary standard for environmental management 
systems. To this end, it quantitatively examines the influence of several hypothesised 
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demand- and supply-side variables believed to influence certification counts using 
data for a panel of 142 developed and developing countries. We control for the 
dynamics of ISO 14001 take-up with the help of a lagged dependent variable which, 
as expected, is found to be highly statistically significant. Countries with a larger 
economy as measured by total GDP also have a greater number of certified facilities 
in per capita terms. We do not know why the variable measuring exports per GDP to 
the US is not merely statistically insignificant in line with our expectation, but instead 
significant with a negative coefficient. The result might simply be down to chance, 
but in future research we want to explore in more detail whether an export orientation 
towards the US market could have a deterrent effect on the up-take of ISO 14001. 
Overall, we find support for the commonly made suggestion that variations in 
the take-up of ISO 14001 can be explained by differences in the incentive structures 
facing firms. Our hypotheses linking environmental demand with certification counts 
are confirmed by the econometric estimations. Firms, in other words, are more likely 
to adopt ISO 14001 where they face strong incentives to do so.  
Going further, our findings lend weight to the claim that the emergence and 
diffusion of self-regulatory initiatives is bound-up with new sources of environmental 
governance “beyond the state”. The level of demand from civil society and market 
actors are individually statistically significant determinants of ISO 14001 certification 
counts in our estimations. Reinforcing the findings of recent work, therefore, the 
present study shows that non-state actors can indeed function as surrogate 
“regulators” encouraging firms to adopt beyond-compliance codes of conduct 
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(Rodgers, 2000; World Bank, 2000).5 Moreover, challenging critics who suggest that 
trade and investment liberalisation are inimical to heightened environmental 
commitment, the findings of the present research suggest that they can actually 
strengthen it. Both the stock of investments by TNCs and exports to Japan and the EU 
(full sample only) are positively correlated with ISO 14001 certification counts. 
Of note, apart from the exports to the EU variable, these results are indifferent to 
the inclusion of developed economies in the sample, indicating that the influence of 
market actors is not simply restricted to a handful of rich countries. This, of course, is 
not to say that growing integration with the global economy is not without its 
environmental costs. Yet the study’s findings contribute to a growing body of 
evidence which suggests that economic globalisation is associated with the diffusion 
of environmentally-beneficial policies, technologies and operating practices 
(Reppelin-Hill, 1999; Garcia-Johnson, 2000; Haufler, 2001; Mielnik & Goldemberg, 
2002). 
Our evidence additionally confirms the proposition that supply-side factors have 
shaped the uneven diffusion of ISO 14001. We find a statistically significant negative 
correlation between productivity and certification counts. This is consistent with 
recent survey evidence which suggests that efficiency gains are a more important 
motive for implementing environmental management systems in developing countries 
(Tanner, 1998; Raines, 2002). 
                                                 
5
 Interestingly, like Damiana et al. (2003) we find that environmental NGOs play a more important 
role in developing countries than in developed ones. 
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The present study furthermore provides support for the positive relationship 
between income and number of ISO certifications.  Given that we control for 
demand-side dynamics (i.e., demand for environmental quality from civil and market 
actors) using our environmental NGOs variable, this result is most likely a product of 
supply-side influences. Specifically, it suggests that firms in low income countries 
may indeed find it more costly and difficult to implement and certify ISO 14001 
compliant management systems, presumably because of a lack of internal (weak 
finances, low levels of technological know-how, etc.) or external capabilities (limited 
availability of consultancy firms, third-party accreditation bodies, etc.). Further work 
is required, however, to clarify the respective role and importance of demand- and 
supply-side factors on ISO certifications. 
Finally, the findings of our study lend measured support to recent conceptual 
accounts which suggest that the evolution and diffusion of private environmental law 
has gone hand-in-hand with the “retreat of the state” (Finger & Tamiotti, 1999; 
Bendell, 2000; Stewart, 2001). Lower levels of state involvement are, according to 
our estimations, significantly associated with higher certification counts. 
Unfortunately, our analysis does not allow us to say whether ISO 14001 exists as a 
substitute or complement to public law and regulation, although they hint towards the 
latter. Clearly, a major challenge for future research is to investigate this question 
using a measurable proxy for the stringency of domestic environmental regulation. To 
our knowledge, however, no adequate measure currently exists to perform such an 
analysis. 
What does our study suggest for policy-makers charged with accelerating the 
diffusion of self-regulatory initiatives? We point to two key areas of leverage. The 
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first centres on supply chains. A number of authors have speculated that  
environmental requirements in export markets are capable of stimulating the up-take 
of ISO 14001 (e.g., Cosbey, 2002; Rock, 2002). Our results support this thesis and 
suggest that public policy could play a role in the global diffusion of EMS activity by 
encouraging firms to specify ISO 14001 as a routine contractual requirement. These 
include, of particular significance, major TNCs whose regional and/or international 
network of suppliers means that they are especially well-placed to promote 
certification activity in both domestic and foreign markets.   
The second point of leverage for policy-makers, meanwhile, is civil society. 
According to our regression analysis demand from environmental NGOs has been a 
significant factor driving firms to certify to the ISO standard. We believe that there is 
considerable scope for governments to strengthen these pressures by publicly 
disseminating information on the take-up of standardised EMS.  Similar approaches 
have proved successful when applied to pollution release data (Tietenberg, 1998; 
World Bank, 2000) and offer a low cost means for public regulators to harness the 
regulatory functions of civil society.  
Yet, recognising the potential difficulties faced by firms in lower income 
countries in implementing and certifying ISO 14001, these and other demand-side 
initiatives will need to be accompanied by supply-side ones aimed at providing 
financial, technical and managerial assistance. Failure to do so might see many small- 
and medium-scale firms excluded from supply chains, with potentially negative 
consequences for local economic development. 
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Table 1 Regional share of ISO 14001 certifications (in 2001) 
 
Region Certifications 
(absolute numbers) 
Certifications 
(per one million inhabitants) 
Share of world total 
(% of absolute numbers) 
Africa/West Asia 923 0.61 2.51 
Central and South America 681 1.78 1.85 
North America 2700 7.74 7.34 
Europe 18243 21.43 49.62 
Far East 12796 5.70 34.80 
Australia and New Zealand 1422 61.16 3.87 
World  36765 5.88 100 
 
Source: ISO (2002) 
  37 
Table 2 Top ten countries by certification count (in 2001) 
 
Country Certifications 
(absolute numbers) 
Certifications 
(per one million inhabitants) 
Share of world total 
(% of absolute numbers) 
Japan 8123 63.96 22.09 
Germany 3380 41.07 9.19 
UK 2722 46.29 7.40 
Sweden 2070 232.74 5.63 
Spain 2064 50.22 5.61 
USA 1645 5.77 4.47 
Australia 1370 70.62 3.73 
Italy 1295 22.37 3.52 
France 1092 18.45 2.97 
China 1085 0.85 2.95 
Total 24846  67.58 
  
Source: ISO (2002) and World Bank (2003) 
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Table 3 Descriptive variable information 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln ISO14001 p.c. 843 -3.31 4.02 -6.91 5.45 
ln ISO14001 p.c. (lagged) 843 -4.08 3.77 -6.91 5.04 
EXPEU15GDP 843 0.13 0.57 0.00 6.64 
EXPUSGDP 843 0.06 0.33 0.00 4.06 
EXPJAPANGDP 843 0.17 0.80 0.00 9.49 
ln FDISTOCKGDP 843 2.68 1.17 -3.11 5.60 
ENVIROGROUPS p.c. 843 2.39 4.12 0.00 22.14 
ln GDP p.c. 843 8.37 1.12 6.07 10.69 
ln GDPPERWORKER 843 22.96 1.30 17.68 26.96 
GOVINTERVENTION 843 2.68 0.88 0.00 5.00 
ln GDP 843 24.41 1.89 19.69 29.82 
ln %MANUFACT 843 2.73 0.57 1.09 4.09 
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Table 4 Countries in sample 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, 
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, China, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea 
(Rep.), Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Note: Countries in italics have no ISO 14001 certifications over the period 1996 to 2001. 
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Table 5 Estimation results 
 I II 
 Full sample Developing countries only 
ln ISO14001 p.c. (lagged) 0.817 0.838 
 (6.55)*** (6.38)*** 
EXPEU15GDP 0.478 0.290 
 (2.12)** (0.87) 
EXPUSGDP -0.917 -0.739 
 (2.30)** (1.72)* 
EXPJAPANGDP 0.227 0.214 
 (2.66)*** (2.62)*** 
ln FDISTOCKGDP 0.155 0.126 
 (2.56)** (3.07)*** 
ENVIROGROUPS p.c. 0.040 0.050 
 (1.69)* (2.01)** 
ln GDP p.c. 0.657 0.564 
 (2.60)*** (2.95)*** 
ln GDPPERWORKER -0.212 -0.223 
 (2.16)** (2.68)*** 
GOVINTERVENTION -0.184 -0.194 
 
(2.80)*** (2.54)** 
ln GDP 0.164 0.160 
 
(2.91)*** (2.42)** 
ln %MANUFACT 0.011 0.046 
 
(0.07) (0.36) 
# Observations 843 705 
# Countries 142 119 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln ISO14001 p.c. OLS with panel-corrected standard errors. 
Absolute t-values in parentheses. Coefficients of constant and year-specific time dummies not 
shown. *  significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Table 6 Estimated short-term or instantaneous percentage increase in ISO 14001 take-up 
following a one standard deviation increase in an independent variable 
 
ln GDP p.c. 73.9% 
EXPEU15GDP 31.3% 
ln GDP 30.6% 
ln GDPPERWORKER -27.5% 
EXPUSGDP -25.9% 
EXPJAPANGDP 20.0% 
ln FDISTOCKGDP 18.1% 
ln ENVIROGROUPS p.c. 17.9% 
GOVINTERVENTION -15.1% 
ln %MANUFACT -0.7% 
 
